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The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent
the Problem That It Can’t Patch Later
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN
*
I.  THE PROBLEM
In order to address the question of remedy, I would like to map out
what I see as the key issue in the Microsoft case.
1  We need to be clear
about the fundamental problem alleged—and perhaps soon proven—if we
are to speak a common language about a remedy.
First, what’s not the central problem: simply having a monopoly.
2  Just
being a monopolist is not alone a concern to many antitrust enforcers; some
markets lend themselves quite naturally to having one dominant player,
and others may find themselves with only one because that player simply
outclasses all others.  The animating idea behind antitrust is not to “punish
winners” out of some kind of arbitrary sympathy for underdog
competitors.
3  Rather, antitrust sanctions are appropriate only if the mo-
nopolist has committed some sort of extra “bad behavior,” behavior that
might leverage the firm’s monopoly power in a way that itself distorts the
market, penalizing even competent, otherwise well-positioned
competitors.
4
Second, behaviors that are problems but not fundamental: most of the
pieces of the kitchen sink of bad monopolist behaviors that have been
thrown at Microsoft at one time or another.  For example, it has been
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 1. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232 (TPJ), CIV. A. 98-1233 (TPJ),
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claimed (but not proven by any means) that Microsoft hires away com-
petitors’ key programmers, and preannounces products that do not exist—
“vaporware”—in order to disrupt the market for competitors’ programs.  If
proven, these amount to anticompetitive problems of the sort antitrust was
designed to address, but they are within reach of the usual toolbox of
remedies for antitrust violations.  The main concern in finding a remedy for
these behaviors may be time: The technology environment moves at a
lightning pace, and by the time a federal case has been made out of a
problem, the problem is proven, a remedy fashioned, and appeals ex-
hausted, the damage may already be irreversible.  I will speak to that issue
when I turn to remedy.
Third, then, the real problem—one that is indeed fundamental: Micro-
soft has brilliantly exploited its current control of the personal computer
operating system (OS) market to grant itself advantages towards control-
ling tomorrow’s operating system market as well.  This exploitation is
wholly apart from being an effective company that makes solid, trusted,
and popular products.  Instead, it flows directly from the control Microsoft
has asserted over user “defaults,” a power Microsoft possesses thanks to a
combination of (1) Windows’ high market share, (2) the “network effects”
that make switching to an alternative so difficult for any given consumer or
computer manufacturer, and (3) software copyright, which largely prevents
competitors from generating software that defeats network effects.  This is
“monopoly maintenance” of a sort that may be enabled only by the distinct
dynamics of the networked technology industry, and which therefore lends
itself to a distinct remedy.
To be sure, monopolistic empires can fall without having to be pushed,
even when they are engaging in strategic “bad behavior” designed to artifi-
cially extend their tenure.  A team sneaking a few extra players on the field
can still lose the game.  I concede this even as I claim that the company
fairly winning the battle to dominate the last generation of networked soft-
ware—particularly operating systems—then has an advantage that it can
press to have an unfair shot at dominating the next, too.  This creates a
consistent anticompetitive problem for which a remedy ought to be ex-
plored, even if sometimes—slowly, inefficiently—the problem can evapo-
rate on its own.  There is no reason to wait for chance, or extraordinary
incompetence in the arenas in which market players normally compete—
product quality, price, marketing, etc.—to be the undoing of an actor that
has been leveraging monopoly power to great advantage.  Indeed, ideally
the market could be structured so that monopoly power can’t be leveraged
to begin with.
II.  THE MONOPOLY
Of course, not everyone has conceded that Microsoft is a monopolist atPrinted on:  08/23/99 2:50 PM C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\zittra~32.doc Saved on:  08/02/99 12:21 PM
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all.
5  There are difficulties defining the relevant market—Apple, after all,
has a lock on the mainstream operating system for personal computers sold
with Motorola 680x0 and PowerPC chips.  Even if we define the market as
“personal computers,” in which Microsoft’s Windows OS has an over-
whelming market share, we should go the extra step to show that the mar-
ket is difficult to contest.  I believe that we can take that step.  Windows’
dominance of the PC OS market is very difficult to challenge, and not just
because it is a daunting and expensive task to write an OS from scratch to
compete with the huge, complex opus that Windows is, or to market that
OS against the established Windows brand.
The significant barriers to entry are twofold, and they function even
without “bad behavior” by the market leader.  The first flows from so-
called “network effects,” through which a given operating system becomes
more valuable as more people use it.
6  Software developers typically write
software for a particular OS, and as more people use a given OS, more
software developers write software for that OS.  The OS then becomes that
much more appealing for other consumers, therefore also for other devel-
opers, creating a mutually reinforcing cycle.  A challenger to the existing
OS faces a mature market in which both software developers and consum-
ers are locked into an embrace that neither can readily untangle, even if, all
else being equal, the upstart OS is better—cheaper, faster, more feature
laden—than the prevailing one.  We see the same phenomenon with file
formats—how many have endured the torture of trying to convert one word
processor’s footnotes to another’s?—and the literal networks that link
many of today’s computers together: they can work better if they are on the
same footing.
The second barrier to entry is intellectual property protection itself, a
form of monopoly granted by the government to authors, inventors, and
software coders.  It is thanks to this protection that competing operating
systems cannot readily adapt their code to be compatible with software
written to run on the OS of the market leader.  I fear that this barrier is so
obvious as to be unexamined, and its role in building and maintaining mo-
nopolies such as Microsoft’s is fundamental.  As I will explain, if we are to
remedy Microsoft’s “bad behavior,” such as it is, the key may rest in giv-
ing them—along with everyone else—less of a monopoly to begin with,
rather than waiting for the exploitation of that monopoly to take shape,
have effect, and then land a market leader in court for antitrust violations.
As the architect of federal tax withholding can testify, it is always easier to
give less to begin with than to take away extra later.
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III.  A WAR FOR THE BROWSER IS A WAR FOR THE OPERATING SYSTEM
I have defined the central problem in the Microsoft case as unfair mo-
nopoly maintenance, and defined the monopoly as one that rests on the
unusual factors of network effects and government-granted intellectual
property protection.  I will now try briefly to show Microsoft’s reliance on
monopoly power to defend its operating system market share with an ex-
ample at the strategic level: Microsoft’s participation in the browser wars.
I will then describe three tactics drawn from the current litigation—in-
stances, if proven, of “bad behavior”—that Microsoft has used as extra
ammunition.
The conventional story of the browser wars is that of Microsoft and
Netscape vying for dominance in a new market: that of the web browser,
which has rapidly become the most common window through which con-
sumers view the Internet.  One could imagine—and the government has
alleged—unfair behaviors that Microsoft might employ to beat Netscape in
this new market.  But the story so far assumes that the stakes are merely
dominance in this new market.  It misses the fact that control of the
browser market has—or at least had—implications for dominance of the
established PC operating systems market.  For Microsoft, Navigator was
not simply a competitor to Internet Explorer in a new applications area
called the “browser market.”  It was also a dagger pointed at Microsoft
Windows.
The blade of the dagger was a software development environment
called Java.  Java’s idea was “write once, run anywhere.”  Different plat-
forms and operating systems could ideally all run Java; the use of such
programs would not be limited to users of a particular operating system.  If
Java could harness the self-reinforcing “network effects” cycle, Windows
would be greatly weakened, since software authors could be writing for
Windows and competing platforms at the same time by writing in Java.  If
Java succeeded, consumers would not pay a premium for a particular oper-
ating system like Windows just because everyone else had it, too.
Java was to find its way on to your computer—whether an Apple
Macintosh or a Windows PC—initially through the Navigator browser.  If
you used Navigator you had Java; if you didn’t, you didn’t.  However, the
maker and licensor of Java, Sun Microsystems, disclaimed the idea of
someday being a new boss just like the old: Sun purported to eschew most
of its intellectual property rights and instead license the Java code freely
and openly.  That way, if Java succeeded in becoming the platform con-
sumers wanted, and for which software authors wrote software, it would
not become a new monopoly exploitable by Sun.  Network effects might
keep it in place—makers of operating systems would deviate from com-
patibility with Sun’s Java at the peril of unpopularity among consumersPrinted on:  08/23/99 2:50 PM C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\zittra~32.doc Saved on:  08/02/99 12:21 PM
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and developers—but Sun could not unilaterally adapt the platform to its
own strategic ends in just the way I am about to claim Microsoft has done
with Windows to win the browser wars.  Note that this is just the way the
protocols of the Internet itself work: TCP/IP and other network standards
are open, freely taken and adapted by anyone, developed by a loose con-
federation of engineers known as the “Internet Engineering Task Force”
(IETF).  The IETF does not charge for its work or limit others’ use of it.
The overwhelming market share for networking protocols is credited to
TCP/IP; it is a monopoly difficult to contest thanks to network effects—
who wants to have a networked computer that cannot talk to any other com-
puter on the network?—but also difficult to exploit thanks to the absence of
any intellectual property claim to control its use, sale, or copying.  (You
may ask why Sun, a for-profit company answering to profit-maximizing
shareholders, would be as generous with Java as the kindly Merlins who
participate in the IETF are with networking standards.  Recall that Sun
makes chips for computers that do not run the Windows operating system
and you can see why it might be to its benefit to break the Windows mo-
nopoly even if it does not end up getting a similar one itself.)
IV.  HOW (NOT?) TO WIN A BROWSER WAR
Navigator did not remain the only path to Java for long.  Microsoft it-
self entered into a now-soured deal with Sun to license Java for use with
Internet Explorer.  That way, consumers could run Java programs so long
as they had either Navigator or IE.  This would seem to add momentum to
the adoption of Java, and thus speed the breakup of Windows as the only
platform for which lots of software is exclusively written.  Why, you might
ask, would Microsoft embrace the instrument of its own undoing in the
operating systems market?  The answer lies in a brilliant defensive master-
stroke by Microsoft: The Java that comes with IE is not exactly the same as
the Java that comes with Navigator and that Sun says is “pure.”  Microsoft
added certain features that are really tempting for an individual software
developer to use.  The cost of using those features in a program is that the
program will no longer run on any platform; instead, it will run only with
Microsoft’s Java as found in IE.  Which Java would succeed—the original
one or Microsoft’s incompatible, proprietary derivative—would depend on
which browser, Navigator or IE, became dominant, since each carried with
it Java’s respective implementations.
When Java was not only embraced by Microsoft but extended (Sun
says “poisoned”) by them, Sun immediately cried foul and made a federal
case all its own out of it.
7  Ironically, the case is grounded in the licensing
conditions imposed on Microsoft for licensing Sun’s “open” standard of
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Java and the Sun-trademarked Java name.  That case may not matter so
much since Microsoft has since re-written its version of Java with entirely
new code, and it might be happy to stop using the Java trademark.  But the
Sun lawsuit highlights the importance of the browser wars: Control of the
browser market is control of Java in its early stages, which is control of a
cross-platform programming environment that in anyone’s hands but Mi-
crosoft’s could sideline Windows itself.  Microsoft did not overplay its
previous-generation OS monopoly by clinging to DOS; instead, it bril-
liantly leveraged DOS into Windows, abandoning the old monopoly to set
itself up for a new one.  We now see how dominance in current-generation
operating systems might be leveraged into dominance for the next: Win-
dows could be abandoned for Microsoft Java.
So, as a matter of strategic monopoly maintenance, Microsoft wanted
to win the browser wars.  One could imagine both fair and unfair tactics of
battle.  One way to distinguish between those categories is to see whether a
tactic is one available to any competitor; tactics adopted by Microsoft and
drawn solely thanks to its dominant position in PC operating systems
smack of anticompetitive abuse of monopoly power.  For example, both
Microsoft and Netscape have been giving away their respective browsers in
a frenetic attempt to retain and gain browser market share; claims of
predatory pricing may ring somewhat hollow when the marginal cost of a
unit of software really does converge to zero no matter who the producer.
Note, however, that even if the marginal cost of software distribution is
non-trivial, pricing below cost in an immature software market can turn out
to be a good strategy, since recoupment through higher prices might be
possible after one wins; network effects and intellectual property rights
work to exclude cheaper players with incompatible but otherwise-
competitive offerings.  Indeed, this might explain deals in which Microsoft
or Netscape literally pay to have their software placed into users’ hands.  I
do not attempt to resolve whether paying distributors or consumers to take
software is of concern; rather, I seek to identify practices that, predatory or
not, are available only to the monopolist.
A. “If you want Windows, you’ll have to agree to take Internet Explorer.”
Of course, Microsoft has an avenue for placing software in users’
hands that Netscape does not and cannot readily buy: the Windows desk-
top.  People buy Windows; people arguably need Windows.  Consumers
want Windows so much that they want it automatically ready for them to
use when they buy a computer; a computer that leaves a factory without
Windows on it in many cases might as well be a paperweight.  If Microsoft
can put IE into Windows, people who buy Windows—which is to say peo-
ple who buy computers—will have IE right in front of them.  The only
thing standing between Microsoft and many Windows consumers is the
“original equipment manufacturer,” or OEM.  OEMs like Dell or CompaqPrinted on:  08/23/99 2:50 PM C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\zittra~32.doc Saved on:  08/02/99 12:21 PM
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buy Windows from Microsoft and then sell computers, with Windows, to
consumers.  Thus Microsoft’s desire to turn its Windows 95 licensing
agreements to its advantage: “OK, Dell, if you want Windows, you will
have to agree to install Internet Explorer as well.”
Now you may ask, “Is it really such a big deal when you first turn on
your new Dell?  You just unpacked it, you turn it on and there’s IE, Inter-
net Explorer, front and center.  Does that really mean you are going to end
up using IE six months from now instead of Netscape, which if you are
willing to wait several hours, you can download and install and have run-
ning parallel with the other browser?”  The answer is, quite credibly, yes.
That really could be.  Indeed, the argument that IE’s default position on the
desktop is not a big deal because you can uninstall it so quickly, and can
easily put in a competing browser, cuts both ways.  If including IE is no
big deal for the consumer, why was compulsory licensing of IE so critical
or so important to Microsoft that it was worth a big fight to retain it during
the litigation over Windows 95?  The existence of those compulsory li-
censes indicates that at least Microsoft believes in the value of having that
IE icon as a default on the desktop.
A less heavy-handed Microsoft tactic would have been to try to simply
persuade companies like Dell to accept it—to say, “By the way Dell, we
have just sealed this deal to give you Windows, don’t you want Internet
Explorer too?  Let’s get you in touch with our Internet Explorer sales force,
and they can convince you how nice it would be, and, believe it or not, the
price is zero, so why not take it?”  But Microsoft didn’t do that.  They left
that route to Netscape, and “competed” by playing their ace in the hole—
their position on the selling end of a contract for Windows 95 through
which they, and only they, could require their browser software to be a
default on every computer that was shipped with Windows 95.
B. “If you want to have your program on the Windows desktop, you’ll
have to agree to put Internet Explorer inside it.”
Another asserted Microsoft tactic linking its control of Windows to ac-
ceptance of IE also involves contract use of monopoly power—this time
involving contracts between Microsoft and America Online.  America On-
line’s lifeblood is new subscribers.  They’ve got to keep new people com-
ing in the door so that their customer base can grow in step with the growth
of the Internet.  To succeed, they too must capitalize on the power of the
default.  After all, when you first turn on your computer, and you click on
something that says, “I’d like to get on the Internet,” you are prompted to
make a decision about your Internet provider—a decision that can be diffi-
cult to reverse, particularly if it entails abandoning one’s long-held e-mail
address.
AOL needed that place on the desktop as a very important strategic
component of signing up new members. Microsoft says, “Okay, it’s ourPrint on:  08/23/99 2:50 PM C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\zittra~32.doc Saved on:  08/02/99 12:21 PM
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desktop, what do you bid?”  And, in fact, it didn’t turn out to be a bid in
money.  Instead, Microsoft said, “Instead of actually paying us a whole lot,
why don’t you agree that your subscribers will use Internet Explorer when
they surf the Web through AOL.”  By trading prime default real estate on
the Windows desktop, Microsoft found yet another path (on top of its deals
with OEMs) to make sure that Internet Explorer (and its corresponding
version of Java), not Netscape, is getting into consumers’ hands.  There is
no parallel deal that Netscape can offer, because they do not own the de-
fault real estate.  It is a deal that only Microsoft, thanks to its monopoly
position, can offer, and it is one that is very difficult for AOL to refuse.
C. “No need to agree to anything.  When you get Windows you’ll notice
Internet Explorer inside, and you won’t know how to take it out.”
A third tactic is now the subject of the current Windows litigation, and
represents a shift in Microsoft’s plan for inclusion of IE in Windows 95.
The lesson Microsoft learned from the Windows 95 litigation over its
forced licensing of IE to OEMs was: “Let’s not use contracts to get the
OEMs to put IE on the desktop.  Customers can still remove it, and we still
have to enforce the contracts if an OEM violates them.  Let’s just build IE
right into Windows 98 and nail it down; OEMs or consumers can pry at it
all they want, but it is not coming back up.”
This is the idea behind technological tying, and it illustrates the amaz-
ing power of the company that controls the operating system, for the OS
defines what the computer user sees and when she sees it.  To define this
control the way an earlier speaker did—as mere advertising—doesn’t do
justice to the amount of power it represents.  Bundling a program right
along with the operating system, which itself comes right along with a new
computer, has benefits for the distributor of that program that cannot be
replicated if the program is merely a third-party add-on—users need not
find the program, wait for a lengthy download or figure out the intricacies
of installation.  The default is a seamless package of clicks from which the
average user will not stray.
These tactics use the market power of Windows to make Internet Ex-
plorer succeed, and thereby thwart the adoption of a Java standard that can
threaten Windows.  They are “unfair” in the sense that they add momentum
to Microsoft’s sales of Windows not earned through the usual competitive
advantages of quality, price, salespersonship, reputation, and goodwill.
They work only because middlepeople like Dell and America Online can-
not afford to lose access to Windows—whether as a product to be resold or
as an environment to gain new clients.Printed on:  08/23/99 2:50 PM C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\zittra~32.doc Saved on:  08/02/99 12:21 PM
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V.  PROPOSED REMEDIES
With the problem stated as one of maintaining an operating system
monopoly rather than merely winning a battle for dominance of a particular
application, I will touch on the possible remedies that have been discussed
in this Symposium and then suggest my own.
A. A Lawsuit Without a Remedy
One remedy that was put forward was the idea of doing nothing.
8  The
idea is that the burden the suit itself placed on Microsoft can remedy its
behavior.  Microsoft’s engineers had to submit to endless depositions, they
had their e-mail rifled through, and they were generally less productive as a
result of the lawsuit’s burden.  That strikes me as a rather dubious remedy,
and one that is not necessarily properly scaled to the problem.  Would
lesser offenders need only be subjected to a few depositions before the
government abandoned the suit?  Further, the burdens of a lawsuit can hurt
all of us—it is a sad day for the whole technology industry when e-mail
must be regularly destroyed as part of new prophylactic document “reten-
tion” policies.
Another rationale offered for doing nothing beyond bringing the law-
suit itself is that the lawsuit has served to embolden Microsoft competitors.
You could call this the “circling vulture” syndrome where potential com-
petitors think, “If the government is really giving Microsoft a kick in the
ribs, maybe I should not be afraid to run up and get a few in too.”  This,
too, strikes me as an unseemly way to encourage competition in a market.
Finally, the claim was made that the lawsuit stops the complained-of
practices.  There is a mixed record on that score.  To be sure, many of Mi-
crosoft’s controversial OS licensing conditions to OEMs have been aban-
doned.  But with Internet Explorer and Windows 98, the licensing condi-
tions at issue have merely been supplanted on the technological side with
the integration of the two programs at the level of software code.  The pro-
ponents of remedy “abstention” have at least one good point here, how-
ever: The combination of browser and operating system at the level of code
is one that law would have difficulty undoing.  There may indeed be bene-
fits to combining the two that have nothing to do with anticompetitive in-
tent, and teasing out good motives from bad is to try to distinguish good
and therefore allowable tech bundles (“Solitaire and Windows” or “Scan-
disk and Windows”) from bad and therefore impermissible ones (“IE and
Windows”)—a market intervention that seems very risky indeed.
B. Criminal Penalties
The second remedy, criminal penalties, was mentioned at the very be-
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ginning, and I will only talk about it very briefly.
9  Could this be criminal
antitrust?  My answer here is: “I hope not.”  It is important to understand
that there is nothing personal here.  I think the campaign of demonization
that goes back and forth, but seems anecdotally primarily focused on Mi-
crosoft and Bill Gates, is not at all helpful to the resolution of this problem.
To see Bill Gates as evil is to misunderstand what the rational capitalist is
about.  Gates’ job is to push the envelope as far as he possibly can in order
to compete.  It is the job of the judicial system to say where the boundaries
of the envelope are and to enforce them in some way, and we are in a con-
text in which the boundaries really are being defined as we go—this is not
as simple as price fixing in a smoke-filled room, and therefore not as read-
ily labeled “malum in se.”  The grain of truth I see in a suggestion of
criminal penalties is the realization that the Microsoft case has touched a
nerve with the public at large, that it is a battle in rhetorical as much as
doctrinal space, fought on a public stage with a large and attentive audi-
ence.  Many observers seem to think the Microsoft case is a referendum on
whether Microsoft and Bill Gates are good or evil; criminal penalties are a
dramatic way to punish a wrongdoer, but not reflective of the true difficul-
ties of the case nor respectful of the uncharted territory in which it is taking
place.
C. A Fine
A third remedy suggested today was a fine; charge Microsoft a one-
time fee to cover the damage it has done.
10  I suppose there is some amount
you could fill in on the check to actually make Microsoft regret whatever
anticompetitive practices were found by the court.  I am not sure I could
guess what it is.  Let us say Microsoft has now secured, with the help of
some of these practices, but not entirely due to them, a better chance than it
would otherwise have to dominate the successor operating system to Win-
dows, or a longer lease on Windows’ life.  How to put a price tag on that?
It makes the typical tort problem of toting up present-value damages for a
loss-of-chance injury look like calculating a dinner tip.  The risk of under-
or overestimating the amount to be deducted makes antitrust enforcement
seem truly a spin at the wheel.  Thus, I do not find a fine particularly inter-
esting.
D. Breakup
Next we heard about divestiture and breakup.
11  I am very much in
agreement with the skeptical views you have heard on that today.  A hori-
zontal split would mean that Microsoft would be divided into separate op-
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erating systems and applications companies; the former would only be al-
lowed to continue developing Windows or other operating systems, but not
to tie applications to it.  However, even after the painful and difficult job of
identifying what is currently properly part of the operating system and
what is a separate application, must the court remain ever vigilant against
OS scope creep?  First, Microsoft’s three Solitaire maintainers have to
leave Microsoft, go into Solitaire, Inc., and hope that their relationship with
the new Microsoft is one that keeps Solitaire at the forefront of gaming in
offices across America.  Then, each projected new feature of the OS will
have to be subjected to some external “objective” test of what belongs
there and what does not, or what constitutes a harmless game and what in
fact is a move by Microsoft to co-opt the next generation OS, something I
have claimed is the case with Java.
Breakup seems like a highly regulatory solution that makes Microsoft’s
parade of horribles about government oversight of private programmers
seem not so fanciful.  To be sure, there are purists who will happily tell you
about what is rightfully in an operating system and what is not.  That may
work within a computer science department, but to ask government to ap-
ply that test represents an abandonment of the idea of letting the market
decide whether an operating system is of greater or lesser value as it throws
in—integrates—so many whistles and bells.
The other kind of split is vertical.  For example, the court could order
that Microsoft prepare five “gold” copies of the Windows 98 source code,
split Microsoft by random lottery or some other fashion, and thereby verti-
cally create Microsoft, Microsoft', Microsoft'', et cetera, put each in a new
headquarters, and let them compete.  It’s already been observed that the
Microsoft descendant that gets Bill Gates is already unduly advantaged
against the other Primes.  More important, there is reason to think that net-
work effects will eventually have us all gravitate to one winner among
them, and then we are just back where we started, in which case it could be
time for another lawsuit.
E. Compulsory Licensing
Solution number five: compulsory licensing of Windows source code
to competitors.
12  The idea behind this is to break Microsoft’s monopoly on
the operating system by allowing others to get under Windows’ hood and
generate competing versions.  This proposed remedy moves in the right
direction because it takes into account the fact that we are talking about
software here, not oil fields or railroads.  The magic of code is that it can
be given to a new person without diminishing its use to the original posses-
sor—except along the dimensions of the original possessor’s “right to ex-
clude others,” which is a basis of the monopoly problem to begin with.
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The problem is that such licensing is indeed complicated, and runs the risk,
as Rick Rule said today, of benefiting competitors, not competition, as it
carves up Microsoft’s empire while letting new ones develop, since works
derivative to the “freed” Windows source code could themselves be copy-
righted.  As with the vertical split idea, even if the delicate licensing issues
are addressed well, we could end up in short order with a new boss as anti-
competitively ornery as the old.
VI.  THE REMEDY WITHOUT A LAWSUIT: REDUCTION OF TERM
OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
To me the real answer lies in uniformly cutting back the current ninety-
five-year term of copyright protection for computer software generally.
This idea springs from the realization that the very basis of the Microsoft
monopoly is the government’s creation and enforcement of intellectual
property law, a market intervention every bit as explicit as a court’s appli-
cation of antitrust law.
Thanks to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
13 Congress
has decreed ninety-five years to be the “limited time” the Constitution or-
dains for intellectual property protection—a time during which software
authors may enjoy the exclusive rights to copy and distribute their work for
the purpose of recouping the effort it took to produce it.
14  The Framers
contemplated that intellectual property protection would not be at all like
“normal” private property, since it represented a balance between rights to
authors—incentives for their hard work—and rights to the public com-
mons, a recognition that free speech means the freedom to build new ideas
out of pieces of old ones.
15
The bargain is that the government will defend a person’s right to pre-
vent others from uttering the things one uttered, or copying the software
one has authored, for ninety-five years, but after that it is the public’s prop-
erty as much as one’s own; the government will no longer defend the in-
tellectual property monopoly that, after all, is defined solely by restrictions
on others’ speech.  Such a long term of protection may make sense for such
enduring favorites as the Lion King or a Madonna song, but the claim that
computer software is creative expression subject to ninety-five years of
protection—monopoly protection given freely by the government—clearly
dismisses any attempt at balance between private and public.  Ninety-five
years might as well be forever, and indeed from some comments today it
seems that we have become acculturated to thinking of intellectual property
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as just plain property, forever belonging to its creator without reversion to
the commons.
Of course, no one really believes that ninety-five years from now Win-
dows 95 would be of great use to either creator or competitor.  Imagine:
“All right everybody, it’s New Year’s 2089, finally the locks are off, we
can get to Windows 95!”  Of course, five years before we would have got-
ten to DOS, and five years before that—let’s see, the winter of A.D. 2075
or so—the Radio Shack TRS-80 operating system.  This is clearly absurd,
and this absurdity bears directly on the problems within the Microsoft
case—problems that I have claimed are too severe to go unaddressed, yet
know no ready remedy within the traditional antitrust framework.
Suppose Congress were to say that for computer expression, for soft-
ware programs, authors get five years of protection, or maybe ten.  They
post the source code to get that protection, and it is kept under lock and key
at the Library of Congress.  The goal is to grant enough years of exclusive
monopoly so that it is worth it for software authors—including operating
systems authors—to generate their wares.  They can milk them for all they
are worth for that five years and recoup their money.  But after that, it is
free.  Anybody can take it.  Anybody can copy it.  The Library of Congress
places the source code onto the World Wide Web with a suitable ribbon-
cutting ceremony.  Anyone can do as she wishes with it.
This applies to all software manufacturers, not just Microsoft.  It does
not require singling out Microsoft and saying—through a lengthy law-
suit—“You’re bad.  We’re going to make you, and only you, license your
software.”  Typically, if one collars a venture capitalist about a great plan
for a new application that is going to revolutionize software and make eve-
rybody a billion dollars, she does not want to hear about a plan that is go-
ing to work ten years from now.  After five years, your chart need not proj-
ect anything further, because no one has any idea what is going to happen
five years from now.  The plan had better contemplate a net profit within
the next five years or the venture capitalist will be in search of another
general direction in which to disgorge money.  Indeed, a shortening of
software term could actually help the software industry—a sort of simulta-
neous legal disarmament through which software authors could realize they
have more to gain in terms of others’ work that comes free for use in their
own creations than they have to lose in that sixth year when their own work
comes free.
Would a reduction in software term actually injure Microsoft?  Would
they regret the decision to make, say, DOS 3.0—a long-forgotten A.D.
1984 precursor to Windows 3.1—if DOS 3.0 were suddenly to enter the
public domain today?  Would they regret making Windows 3.1 (A.D.
1990) if Windows 3.1 were suddenly to enter the public domain today?
They certainly would not have “direct” regrets in the form of lost profits
from sales of those products.  One cannot buy Windows 3.1 from Micro-Print on:  08/23/99 2:50 PM C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\zittra~32.doc Saved on:  08/02/99 12:21 PM
14 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:???
soft today.  Microsoft’s only regret would be in the potential competition
that these products could provide to Windows 98—yes, competition.
The real fear would be that if Windows 3.1 source code becomes free,
goes from the proprietary to the open, those do-good engineers at the Inter-
net Engineering Task Force could come and start picking over it, can start
making things out of it.  University students could dissect it as part of
Computer Science 101.  They could make a derivative version, say Win-
dows 3.2, which perhaps could compete pretty well with Windows 2000—
if Windows 2000 does not represent a true innovative leap ahead from
prior operating systems.  Now Microsoft has a problem: competition
without the power of network effects on their side.  For when Windows 3.1
becomes free, so do all the applications developed to run upon it.  Some
consumers will still want the absolute latest Windows from Dell, and Dell
will have to deal with Microsoft for it.  But it won’t be Windows or
nothing anymore; it will be old Windows (and new third-party derivatives)
vs. new Windows.  The ability of anyone—Microsoft, Sun, anyone that
might sooner or later lay claim to a proprietary standard that could become
the dominant player—to call the shots indefinitely, leveraging today’s
dominance into tomorrow’s, will be based upon competitive advantage
instead of the rut of network effects and the dead-hand power of
intellectual property.
How does this boil down to advice for Judge Jackson in the current
Microsoft litigation, should he find against the company?  David Post has
suggested a general rule whereby the government would strip away copy-
right protection for computer software that has achieved market domi-
nance.
16  As a general rule, this seems difficult to apply—how would mar-
ket dominance be found, and what components of an integrated software
package would be thought to be “dominating.”  Applied to the Microsoft
case, this would resemble the compulsory licensing remedy.  The licensing
fee would simply be set at zero, and Microsoft would be compelled to re-
lease clean source code from which any and all competitors could crib.
The more comprehensive and self-executing solution that I suggest—a
five-year copyright term for every piece of software, regardless of author
or subsequent market success—requires new law.  In the meantime, if in-
deed Microsoft is found to have abused its power, Judge Jackson could
reasonably single out the release of Windows source code as a fair remedy,
and a test of some of the benefits such a law could bring.
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